We are deeply social creatures. Our core social needs - for meaningful social inclusion-are more important than our civil and political needs and our economic welfare needs, and we won't secure those other things if our core social needs go unmet. Our core social needs ground a human right
against social deprivation as well as a human right to have the resources to sustain other people. Kimberley Brownlee defends this fundamental but largely neglected human right; having defined social deprivation as a persistent lack of minimally adequate access to decent human contact, she then
discusses situations such as solitary confinement and incidental isolation. Fleshing out what it means tothers. Our core social needs can clash with oo belong, Brownlee considers why loneliness and weak social connections are not just moral tragedies, but often injustices, and argues that we endure
social contribution injustice when we are denied the means to sustain ur interests in interactive and associative freedom, and when they do, social needs take priority. We have a duty to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to satisfy their social needs. As Brownlee asserts, we violate this duty
if we classify some people as inescapably socially threatening, either through using reductive, essentialist language that reduces people to certain acts or traits - 'criminal', 'rapist', 'paedophile', 'foreigner' - or in the ways we physically segregate such people and fail to help people to
reintegrate after segregation.
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1. Social Beings
2. Social Deprivation
3. Sustaining Others
4. Interactional Freedom
5. Dilemmas of Sociability
6. Associational Freedom
7. Moral Messiness
8.
Segregation
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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Kimberley Brownlee is a Professor of Philosophy and holds the Canada Research Chair in Ethics and Political & Social Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. Her current research focuses on sociability, social rights, loneliness, and freedom of association. She is the author of
Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience (OUP 2012), co-editor of Disability and Disadvantage (OUP 2009), and co-editor of The Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy (Wiley 2016). She was previously a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick.
