Most people believe that it is sometimes morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. In Defensive Killing, Helen Frowe offers a detailed exploration of when and why the use of such force is permissible. She begins by considering the use of force between
individuals, investigating both the circumstances under which an attacker forfeits her right not to be harmed, and the distinct question of when it is all-things-considered permissible to use force against an attacker. Frowe then extends this enquiry to war, defending the view that we should judge
the ethics of killing in war by the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. She argues that this requires us to significantly revise our understanding of the moral status of non-combatants in war. Non-combatants who intentionally contribute to an unjust war forfeit their rights not to
be harmed, such that they are morally liable to attack by combatants fighting a just war.
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1. Threats and Bystanders
2. Killing Innocent Threats
3. Moral Responsibility and Liability to Defensive Harm
4. Liability and Necessity
5. War and Self-Defence
6. Non-Combatant Liability
7. Non-Combatant Immunity
8. Implications
and Objections
Bibliography
Index
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Helen Frowe is Wallenberg Academy Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Stockholm, where she directs the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace. She is the author of The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction (Routledge, 2011), and co-editor of How We Fight: Ethics in
War (OUP, 2014).
Making Sense - Margot Northey and Joan McKibbin
