The claim that there are objective ethical truths has attracted its share of doubters. Many have thought that such truths would require an extra-ethical foundation or vindication--in metaphysics, or the philosophy of language, or epistemology--and have worried that no such thing is available.
Pragmatist Quietism argues that, on the contrary, there are objective ethical truths, and that these neither require nor admit of a foundation or vindication from outside of ethics. Recognizing that the idea of an ethical realm untethered from inquiry into reality, meaning, and knowledge may strike
us as mysterious, this book offers a comprehensive meta-ethical worldview within which this jarring proposal may be ensconced. The key moves are, first, the assimilation of normative-ethical inquiry to the sorts of debates that many have labelled 'merely verbal' or 'non-substantive', and second, the
adoption of pragmatism--the approach to inquiry and explanation on which we endeavour to guide our thinking by considerations of value, rather than aiming to correctly represent the world.
1. Introduction
2. Raw Materials
3. Why Does There Seem to Be a 'Problem with Ethics'?
4. Objectivist Quietism about Ethics: The Positive View
5. Objectivist Quietism about Ethics: Objections and Responses
6. Pragmatism
7. Digging Deeper
8. Moral Epistemology
9.
Pragmatist Quietism vs. Expressivism
10. Quietism and Counter-Normativity
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Andrew Sepielli is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He has published work on ethics, meta-ethics, pragmatism, and the philosophy of law.
