Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late twentieth-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse, who has made notable contributions to this development, now presents a full exposition and defence of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. She shows how virtue
ethics can provide guidance for action, illuminate moral dilemmas, and bring out the moral significance of the emotions. Deliberately avoiding a combative stance, she finds less disagreement between Kantian and neo-Aristotelian approaches than is usual, and she offers the first account from a virtue
ethics perspective of acting 'from a sense of duty'. She considers the question which character traits are virtues, and explores how answers to this question can be justified by appeal to facts about human nature. Written in a clear, engaging style which makes it accessible to non-specialists, On
Virtue Ethics will appeal to anyone with an interest in moral philosophy.
Introduction
Action1. Right Action
2. Resolvable Dilemmas
3. Irresolvable and Tragic Dilemmas
Emotion and Motivation4. Aristotle and Kant
5. Virtue and the Emotions
6. The Virtuous Agent's Reasons for Action
7. Moral Motivation
Rationality8.
The Virtues Benefit their Possessor
9. Naturalism
10. Naturalism for Rational Animals
11. Objectivity
Bibliography, Index
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Rosalind Hursthouse is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland, New Zealand.
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